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Introduction
In Alexander Kluge’s movie Der Angriff der Gegenwart auf die übrige Zeit (The Assault 
of the Present on the Rest of Time), people live in a ‘distended present’ (Kluge 
et al. 1990: passim): faced with uncertain – personal and societal – futures, they are 
unable to make lasting decisions and remain trapped in an unending present. In 
this contribution, we discuss another ‘assault on the rest of time’ that was just in the 
making when Kluge’s film appeared in 1985 – namely, the ways in which finance 
shapes and formats the politics of the future. Our central tenet is that, far from pro-
viding an engine for imagining substantive futures that guide (collective) actions, 
finance ‘consumes’ forecasts, plans or visions. They serve as mere signals (Langenohl 
and Wetzel 2011), fuelling an increasingly short- term (Montagne 2009), febrile 
hunt for novelties from which profit can be generated by beating others to it.
In (economic) theory, prices will oscillate – more or less – evenly around the 
expected ‘intrinsic’ value in response to incoming signals, so that ‘the time average 
of an observable [is] equal to its expectation value’ (Peters 2019: 1216). Based on 
this statistical premise of ‘ergodicity’, there can be no fundamental discontinuity 
between future, on the one hand, and past and present, on the other  – so that 
rational inter- temporal calculation and expectations become possible (Beckert and 
Bronk 2018: 18– 20).1 As the formal models and calculative devices through which 
economic agents project and imagine the future are built on these assumptions, 
the ergodic continuity between past, present and future effectively becomes part 
of the background frame within which signals about the future are given meaning 
and translated in the present. We thus suggest that the temporality of contemporary 
finance is at odds with modernist conceptions of futurity as involving an epi-
stemic ‘back and forth’ between a given present and an open future, out of which 
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‘future’ towards which finance is oriented (Arrow 1978) is constantly collapsed into 
the present through an ongoing process of ‘pricing in’ the future and rendering it 
calculable according to an a- temporal space of possibilities. For modern finance, 
the future has become a useful means of acting in the present, rather than an onto-
logically distinct state that we imagine and construct based on joint imaginations as 
we proceed towards it from the present. We develop this point by discussing the case 
of derivatives markets. We show how derivatives markets depend directly on the 
assumption of a ‘synchronicity’ of present and future, built directly into the central 
valuation device on which the functioning of these markets depends – the so- called 
Black- Scholes- Merton formula. We extend this argument in the second part of 
our contribution, where we describe how central banks have developed a finance- 
oriented and finance- based ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 2007[1978]). Under this 
regime, central banks really do not govern future inflation, but present expectations 
of future inflation as expressed in the ‘yield curve’ and built into interest rate 
derivatives. We suggest that the use of rational expectations models that construe 
the future as ‘conserved’ within an ergodic, a- temporal world allows central banks 
to ignore possible ‘random’ fluctuations in actual inflation and concentrate on the 
internal calibration of present expectations of future inflation as the sole criterion 
for monetary policy success. We show that this ‘assault’ of present expectations on a 
future that never becomes actualised was an important factor in the run- up to the 
crisis of 2007– 2009. Central banks have facilitated forms of financial valuation that 
rely on key fictions of an ergodic world (in particular the ‘natural’ interest rate), by 
stabilising the expectational parameters which manifest these fictions, and have thus 
helped to black- box uncertainties. The crisis itself, and post- crisis interventions, 
have not led to a ‘reckoning’ with a different temporality, but have activated various 
support mechanisms and new policy tools (e.g. ‘forward guidance’) that shield and 
maintain this ‘practical fiction’ and the ‘infrastructure’ (Star and Ruhleder 1996) of 
an ergodic world for contemporary finance. What has become clearer, though, is 
that the particular constellations of policy institutions and financial markets found 
in contemporary capitalism do not support economic prosperity and sustainability 
for society as a whole.
The ergodic world of ‘quantitative’ finance
Compared to the embedded, ‘boring finance’ of the period from the 1950s to the 
1980s, in the contemporary financial system the contingency of all financial activity 
with regard to the future has become much more visible. In particular, the ‘openness 
of the future’ (Beckert 2015: 35ff), and the problem that an open future is neces-
sarily contingent and therefore ‘fundamentally uncertain’ (Knight 1921) has moved 
centre- stage in discussions about contemporary finance. Whereas, in the ‘golden 
age of capitalism’ (Marglin and Schor 2000), finance lived well by the ‘3- 6- 3’ rule 
(charge a 3 per cent mark- up on credit over the 3 per cent interest paid out on 
deposits and be off to the golf course at 3pm) (Walter 2006), the de- regulation and 
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into an explicit epistemic problem. As a result, financial (and economic) activity has 
become much more directly dependent on the elaboration of ‘imagined futures’ 
and calculative ‘instruments of imagination’ for the coordination of expectations 
(Beckert 2016: 216ff.). Since the liquidity and stability of markets hinge directly on 
the continuity of valuations (and the knowledge underpinning them) (Carruthers 
and Stinchcombe 1999) this means that these epistemic practices and calculative 
instruments – and the joint expectations of the futures that they help construct – 
have become central to the functioning of contemporary finance.
It has therefore become common for both practitioners and observers to under-
stand contemporary finance as revolving around the problem of mitigating the fun-
damental epistemic uncertainty of a future that is open and contingent. In this view, 
finance has become a primary site for ‘acting in an uncertain world’ (Callon et al. 
2009), where market participants learn to forecast and imagine such futures through 
calculative devices and/ or hedge against uncertainties using various financial tools. 
The crucial significance of finance in modern society thus stems from its role as 
an institution that allows social actors to cope, manage and live with an uncertain 
future, and to render this open future as a space of possibilities – for speculation, 
investment, hedging, insurance, betting etc.
There is, however, some reason to be cautious about the notion that uncertainty 
in finance is – primarily – a function of the irreducible gap between present futures 
and actual future presents. The historian Reinhart Koselleck (1989) has theorised this 
gap as being a result of historical experiences that have led actors to distinguish 
these two distinct forms of ‘future’: the future as imagined in the present (‘present 
future’) and future presents, i.e. future states of the world when they (have) become 
present, or actualised. However, this decidedly modern form of temporality is not 
the one that reigns in contemporary finance.
To argue this point, we need to look at precisely how epistemic accuracy of 
expectations about the future present matters in finance. As John Maynard Keynes 
and Hyman Minsky pointed out long ago, the openness of the future manifests itself 
as an ‘economic survival constraint’: false or inaccurate present futures are costly, or 
even life- threatening, to economic units, if investments fail. For that reason, Keynes 
and Minsky thought that as uncertainty is more directly and intensively felt, eco-
nomic units will avoid tying down their wealth in risky investments and will pro-
tect themselves against adverse risks by stocking up on liquid reserves.
The key characteristic of this uncertainty – the uncertainty of having enough 
liquid means to meet upcoming obligations – is that it cannot readily be made 
measurable:  it depends on the behaviour of various other actors (e.g. money 
market lenders) and the various feedback processes by which one’s own and others’ 
decisions (e.g. asset sales) affect the state of the financial system as a whole. However, 
as central banks have encouraged and supported financial markets’ reliance on ‘erg-
odic fictions’ for valuation and risk management, this uncertainty has ceased to fea-
ture in the regular calculations and strategies of financial actors and in the structures 
of the financial system, giving way to a world in which actors act most of the 
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To understand how and why, we need to decipher the role played by rational 
expectations (as both a category of practice and a theory) in contemporary finance. 
Discounting expected future returns to calculate an asset’s present value requires 
knowledge of the future development of macroeconomic variables (such as growth, 
interest rates or inflation, etc.) which, in models and formulas derived from rational 
expectations economics, shape this present value, as joint expectations about such 
parameters become widely embedded in valuations (Bryan and Rafferty 2006). 
Such parameters come to define a ‘normality’ as background to and a condition 
of asset valuations, with market actors closely tracking any anomalies that might 
affect asset values (Christophers 2017; Zaloom 2009). This ‘normality’ has become 
an intrinsic background for the joint structures of knowledge that secure the con-
tinuity of valuations and market transactions, and thus undergird the liquidity and 
stability of ‘market- based finance’ (Hardie and Howarth 2013). This background 
establishes a (calculative and epistemic) continuity between the present and the 
future, built directly into the fabric of financial markets, against which more narrow 
present futures can be elaborated, processed, adopted or discarded. The intense 
concern with the future in contemporary finance is thus made possible by this 
‘synchronist’ (Langenohl 2018) background, which anchors the impressive array 
of instruments of imagination in an a- temporal skeletal structure upon which the 
validity of any calculation of present futures depends.
This ergodic conception of time (Kirstein 2015) is important for contemporary 
finance particularly in those contexts in which the respective parameters are directly 
incorporated into the markets’ valuation devices. A case in point are the derivatives 
markets, which do not value and trade normal financial assets (such as stocks or 
currencies) but which are based on contracts through which parties directly wager on 
future prices of underlying assets in relation to specific future events. Derivatives thus 
express imagined futures and the valuations they imply (through discounting), without 
the need to possess or actually trade underlying assets. This might suggest that, if any-
where, it is in the derivatives markets that actors care about whether their present futures 
actually become future presents at some point in time. But this is not how valuation 
and pricing works in these markets, which are based on the common valuation infra-
structure that relies on the Black- Scholes- Merton formula (Watson 2007; MacKenzie 
and Millo 2003; Black and Scholes 1973). With this formula, traders no longer focus 
on particular events and future presents as they arrive but instead trade what is called 
‘volatility’ – a measure of the variability of prices over time that is dependent on such 
variation remaining ergodic (Davidson 1982). Using this calculative tool, participants 
thus engage in a market process in which particular events and risks are subsumed with 
regards to a ‘synchronic’ background system of valuation and pricing.
The validity and applicability of the Black- Scholes- Merton formula is thus 
premised on this assumption of a fundamentally static and continuous world that does 
not undergo any fundamental substantive changes. In this world, present futures are 
nothing but short- lived inputs or signals that generate possibilities for arbitrage, but 
do not affect the static background continuity that undergirds the system. However, 
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‘tail- end’ events in a probability distribution occur – a system of valuations premised 
on ergodicity becomes incoherent, leading markets to freeze. As Donald MacKenzie 
(2004; MacKenzie and Millo 2003) has shown, the 1987 stock market crash drove 
home the limits of this ergodic depiction of temporality, and practitioners adjusted 
their Black- Scholes- Merton pricing ad hoc and modified the price curve for options 
so that longer- termed options now include an uncertainty premium (the so- called 
‘volatility smile’ or ‘skew’) on top of their ‘ergodic’ price.
Derivatives markets thus highlight particularly clearly how the synchronist back-
ground against which financial valuation operates mitigates uncertainty, not by 
encouraging actors to reckon with an uncertain future but by excluding the possi-
bility that the future might be discontinuous with the present (in aggregate terms) 
in any radical sense. For the continuous functioning of financial markets, it is more 
important to uphold a stable background of expectations than to know the future 
accurately. The synchronist frame operatively decouples actions taken in reaction to 
and in terms of present futures from the actual future present(s) that come to pass.
Many observers and practitioners have noted how this separation from this cal-
culative background has made the sequential processing of transitory present futures 
at the ‘surface’ of the market  almost ritualistic (e.g. LiPuma 2017; Ayache 2016). 
The unfolding of present futures is largely irrelevant to, and does not feed into, 
the static expectations about the future encoded in this background, which are re- 
asserted or ‘performed’ anew with every transaction that makes use of instruments 
of valuation or calculation derived from rational expectations models (cf. LiPuma 
2017). Derivatives markets thus form the extreme end of a continuum but high-
light the logical conditions of why the liquidity and stability of modern financial 
markets depends on this calculative background. They illustrate why the accuracy of 
expectations is not actually put to the test (or at least only idiosyncratically, for indi-
vidual traders) as long as markets can operatively hold on to this ‘useful’ fiction of a 
continuous, normal and ergodic world. As a result, for modern finance the future 
itself is continuously ‘ontologically absent’ (Law and Urry 2004): it is a horizon of 
possibilities that provides inputs for arbitrage, but must remain invisible at the level of 
the constitutive fiction of the never- changing future on which market stability rests.
The modern financial system is thus based on ‘wilful’ or ‘strategic ignorance’ 
(McGoey 2012) of the future present as a constitutive principle: excluding the pos-
sibility of substantive discontinuities between present and future is what enables the 
‘transformation of uncertainty into risk’ (Carruthers 2013) and secures the possibility 
of rational calculation and action in markets in the present. As market coordination 
increasingly depends on the construction, projection and diffusion of ‘commen-
surable’ (Espeland and Stevens 1998) present futures, this common background has 
gained in importance. It allows translating present futures into numeric prices, and 
thus is central to securing the congruence of expectations (about present and future 
prices) in markets. The financial system’s ability to process information about the future 
thus depends on the continuous operative denial of the openness of this very future. 
Whatever individual actors might think privately, at the level of the market public, 
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and neutralised – as a precondition for the system’s ability to process any signals about 
the future that might entail (limited) re- valuations and price changes at all.
Evidently, excluding the possibility of a fundamental discontinuity of the eco-
nomic present and future mathematically does not protect financial actors from 
suffering the consequences of being (collectively) wrong. However, Minsky has 
shown, with his now famous ‘financial instability hypothesis’ (Minsky 1980), that 
if central banks are actively working to protect markets from a breakdown of the 
fictional continuity and the ‘normal market conditions’ it enables, they are effect-
ively removing the survival constraint on financial institutions. In other words, they 
protect market actors from ever having to face fundamental discontinuity, allowing 
them instead to continue processing present futures without concerning themselves 
with their accuracy. As Minsky pointed out, by continuously neutralising the effects 
of fundamental dissonances about the future, and shoring up ‘normal’ assumptions 
about the future in order to secure the ‘normal’ operations of the system, one also 
abolishes any incentives to look out for, and be prepared for, the possibility of fun-
damentally different futures, blanking out underlying systemic uncertainties.
The more market actors are assured that normal market conditions will continue 
(indefinitely) into the future, the more the future becomes a ‘useful fiction’, that 
is continuously presupposed but must never actually affect the normal operations 
of the system. As we shall see in the next section, central banks’ efforts to gain 
‘infrastructural power’ (Walter and Wansleben 2019; Braun and Gabor 2019; Braun 
2018a), by seeking to develop technologies for influencing financial markets (and 
the economy) by ‘governing through expectations’ (Wansleben 2018; Braun 2015), 
have become directly complicit with this specific temporality of modern finance.
Hegemonic futures in financialised capitalism
The role of an ergodic world as a calculative background for market coordination 
has gained increased general societal and economic importance through processes 
of financialisation. Financialisation can be used as a descriptive term to depict how 
the size of finance has grown compared to the rest of the economy (Stockhammer 
2008), how corporations shift their sources of profit from production to finan-
cial activities (Krippner 2005) and/ or how households in Western economies have 
become increasingly entangled in financial markets, as mortgage holders, employees 
with private pension plans, owners of life insurance products and the like (van 
der Zwan 2014; Davis 2009). We use the concept here in a related but somewhat 
different sense. Our interest is in how the logics of coordination that are reliant 
on particular conceptions of futurity become dominant in regard to the ways in 
which capitalist democracies are rendered governable. We are thus interested in 
reconstructing a particular ‘governmentality’ that is not exhaustively described 
with regards to shareholder value, speculative identities or even particularistic elite 
interests, but that concerns the fundamental ways in which capitalism is stabilised 
as a social system. This sounds like a rather grand claim but we believe there is 
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associated with the emergence of central banks as the most powerful governors in 
advanced capitalist states.
The specific proposition that we make is that central banks have contributed 
to transcending the role of contemporary finance by tying their own practices of 
macroeconomic policy- making to this particular realm (Krippner 2011). We will 
here limit this discussion to the symbolic- communicative dimension of central 
banks’ governing – a topic that has raised much interest in sociological (Braun 2015) 
and anthropological (Holmes 2013) research. The innovation identified by these 
scholars is that central bankers have learned to govern monetary developments by 
communicating their intentions and planned interventions; the markets, reacting to 
such signals, then are thought to adapt accordingly, performatively bringing about 
the effects that the central banks intended to obtain. The point that we want to elab-
orate on here is that such ‘performative’ central banking should not be considered 
as a neutral strategy for achieving legitimate political objectives like low inflation 
and stable growth. The respective practices of governing rather require that central 
banks align their interventions with the structure of financial markets, and with the 
particular mechanisms through which these markets project their ‘present futures’.
This firstly entails a subtle, but important, shift in the very object of governing. 
The sociological argument underlying the idea of ‘expectational governance’ is 
that central banks can control price- setting in the economy by influencing the 
expectations that economic actors have with regard to changes in the inflation 
rate (Beckert 2016). When these actors – like wage bargainers – expect inflation to 
remain stable, they will be more moderate with their wage claims and their mark- 
up pricing, and thereby produce the low inflation rates that they assume will prevail. 
This self- confirmatory logic is intuitive. But surveys have shown time and again 
that the general public’s expectations are relatively fickle and that inflation rates can 
be influenced by various factors, not all of which are expectational (Lombardelli 
and Saleheen 2003). Central bankers have resolved these uncertainties and problems 
by redefining what they actually control: not inflation itself but inflation expectations, as 
incorporated into financial markets’ calculations and operations. The assumption is that, as 
long as these specific expectations remain stable, it does not matter that prices actu-
ally fluctuate somewhat, or that most people do not have a good understanding of 
how inflation will evolve. As a consequence, cognitive and normative expectations 
inherent in markets, rather than the demands, claims and ideas from the broader 
economy, become the linchpin for assessing central bankers’ success, and for 
orienting their macroeconomic policies. Financial market expectations thus have 
become central banks’ primary objects of governing: all that matters is that financial 
market prices – primarily long- term interest rates – reflect expectations that infla-
tion will remain stable and low.
This reorientation to markets was well articulated by Ben Bernanke – an archi-
tect of inflation targeting – who claimed that ‘monetary policy is a cooperative 
game. The whole point is to get financial markets on our side and for them to do some 
of our work for us’ (cited in Mallaby 2017: 612, our emphasis). In other words, 
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economic futures more generally, and they reinforce this hegemony by aligning 
their communications with the specific logics of these markets.
This brings us to a second dimension of such finance- oriented expectation 
coordination – the fictitious elimination of radical uncertainty and the simulation 
of an ergodic socio- economic system with stable parameters within which finan-
cial expansion can unfold. To illustrate this point, let us imagine a central bank 
that has some expertise in finance and the economy, but that only imprecisely and 
‘with uncertainty’ knows how the economy will evolve going forward – what the 
level of employment will be, how much output is going to be produced, how the 
employment level and output are going to relate to the productive capacities of 
the economy, how such interactions will affect the price level – not to speak of 
the uncertainties arising from developments in asset and credit markets that affect 
banking, household wealth, productive facilities, consumer spending etc. Such a 
semi- knowledgeable, semi- ignorant central bank would decide on interest rates in 
somewhat unpredictable ways, and there may be many occasions in which markets 
are taken by surprise.
However, with the introduction of inflation targeting since the late 1980s, it 
became imperative to create far more predictability between central banks and 
markets. This made it necessary to render invisible these fundamental uncertainties 
faced by policy- makers (Walter and Wansleben 2019). Accordingly, central bankers 
increasingly drew on a model of the economy in which uncertainty was in fact not 
an important factor (Woodford 2009). Equilibrium output, the non- inflationary 
rate of employment and the natural rate of interest were all assumed to be know-
able variables that could orient policy- making and its coordination with financial 
markets. Accordingly, there were fewer and ‘fewer occasions on which the author-
ities’ decisions – as opposed to the underlying economic developments – cause[d] 
uncertainty in the markets’ (Butler and Clews 1997: 48) – which was perceived as 
a virtue of the inflation targeting regime.
In other words, the tools and techniques of macroeconomic policy championed 
by central banks have enhanced and strengthened the ‘normality expectations’ 
undergirding valuations in financial markets. This has then reinforced the expan-
sionary dynamics of finance, leading to a proliferation of contracts (e.g. of securitised 
assets), market relations and balance sheets that presuppose an unchanging macro-
economic background structure upon which financialisation rests (Nesvetailova 
2015; Mehrling 2011). Particular features of financialisation, such as the interrelated 
expansion of asset and money markets, rely on these normality expectations, and 
more generally on the notion that central banks will maintain stability in regard 
to all major macroeconomic variables (inflation, interest rates) that are relevant for 
financial markets. However, as the transatlantic financial crisis of 2007– 2009 has 
brought home, the ‘success’ of central banks’ coordination with finance should not 
be confused with the development of reliable and sustainable ways of governing 
capitalist democracies. Indeed, the events in these years rather demonstrated that the 
self- validation between policy- makers and market actors had become dissociated 
from the actual socio- economic structures – precarious labour market situations, 
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purported to refer (e.g. Fligstein et al. 2017). However, this has not led to a funda-
mental questioning of the governmentality regime associated with financialisation. 
Rather, central banks’ ‘unconventional’ expansionary monetary policies since 2009 
reflect a reinforcement of finance- oriented and finance- centred policy- making 
(Braun 2018b). The central aim of post- crisis policy has been to reinstate confi-
dence within finance about the indefinite continuity of ‘normal’ patterns of output, 
inflation, interest rates etc., with the intended effect of inducing market actors 
to re- engage in investments and credit provision, which are believed to generate 
growth. Finance thus remains at the centre of macroeconomic governance and thus 
maintains its privileged role in ‘mature’ capitalism.
To be fair, there has been some critical discussion among expert economists 
about the adverse consequences of such regimes. For instance, Tobias Adrian and 
Nelly Liang write that:
Monetary policy works though financial conditions on expected economic 
outcomes, but risks to financial stability involve potential tail risks. The tail 
risks to future macroeconomic outcomes manifest only in some states of the 
world, when adverse shocks are realized. These dimensions are important 
because they greatly complicate efforts to incorporate financial stability in 
the determination of monetary policy. Policy makers would need to look 
beyond expected conditions for downside risks that arise with uncertain 
probability in the future (2016: 4).
Yet there seems to be little appetite among policy- makers to take seriously these 
adverse financial stability effects, not to speak of the broader societal problems, 
which arise from the current finance- oriented governance regime.
Conclusion
Up until now the highly problematic ‘politics of the future’ entailed by the char-
acteristic temporality of modern finance, and its widening implications due to 
financialisation, have by- and- large passed under the radar (but see, Adkins 2018; 
Langenohl 2018; 2007). While our focus in this chapter has been on how techno-
logical, epistemic and political infrastructures make this temporality more durable 
and lend it a degree of invisibility, the concerns we would like to raise are related 
to these – for the most part sociological and anthropological – ‘diagnostics of the 
present’.
To be sure, the fragilities in the financial system that result from the continuous 
need to stabilise the ‘discounted’ fictive future values in the present have been 
widely noted (Mehrling 2011; Nesvetailova 2007), but they have only rarely been 
linked to the peculiar temporalities of modern finance (but see LiPuma 2017). 
More commonly, financial fragility is instead interpreted as an issue of complexity – 
to be addressed by increasing the transparency of markets, and in particular by 
reducing the epistemic uncertainty that this complexity generates with regard to 
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Following from our argument, the present attempts, through regulation and 
monetary policy, to manage and contain the complexity of contemporary finance 
may, paradoxically, contribute to instability if the main aim remains to stabilise the 
working fiction of an ergodic, ‘timeless’ temporality on which financial markets 
are premised. This ergodic normality has become the very foundation of the cal-
culability of financial values (Peters 2019), its commensurability across assets and 
markets, and thus the liquidity and stability of those markets themselves. This is all 
the more the case as there has been a marked, global trend towards market- based 
finance (Murau 2017; Gabor 2016) in which the ability to shift assets in markets has 
become the basis of liquidity (Mehrling 2011), increasing the systemic risk entailed 
by disruptions to this frame of calculability. The need to protect this temporality, the 
frame of calculability and structure of valuations it undergirds, forces central banks 
into continuing their role of reinsurer of systemic risk and market- maker of last 
resort that contributed to the 2007– 2009 crisis, backstopping the value of a widening 
pool of – only seemingly – ‘liquid’ assets (Mehrling 2011; Borio and White 2004). 
The ‘unconventional’ monetary policies of quantitative easing pursued by central 
banks around the world since 2008 are even named so as to evoke their rationale 
of restoring and safeguarding the technical presuppositions of ‘normal’ or ‘conven-
tional’ forms of governability. Likewise, the ‘macro- prudential’ financial regulation 
that has come to dominate regulatory debates (Coombs 2017; Baker 2013) attempts 
to correct the fragilities created by the ‘distended present’ of modern finance by 
increasing the transparency of risks (e.g., through stress tests), creating resiliences 
and facilitating ‘efficient’ risk- sharing within the financial system. Despite some 
undeniable innovations at the level of technical frameworks and instruments at its 
disposal since 2008– 2009, monetary policy thus continues to be geared towards 
ergodicity as its operative framework. ‘Macro- pru’ and unconventional policies aim, 
first and foremost, at restoring and protecting normal conditions in financial markets, 
as a platform for effective monetary policy. This normality is conceived of in ergodic 
terms and observed through (mathematical) models that are premised on ergodicity. 
Deviations from normality thus become an impediment to be neutralised in order 
to secure the inter- temporal consistency and effectiveness of monetary policy – 
rather than being seen as (potentially) indicative of (fundamental) uncertainties 
of which market actors (and central banks!) would need to take heed, and which 
might require adjustments to their calculative strategies. Instead, central banks pro-
actively seek to restore ‘quasi- ergodic’ conditions in financial markets, by reducing 
what they perceive as market imperfections that prevent the even inter- temporal 
dissemination of monetary policy signals. However, in combating manifestations 
of uncertainty as anomalies that stand in the way of monetary policy operations 
premised on the ergodicity of finance and the economy, central banks are sterilising 
the very signs that the future may indeed substantively differ from past and present. 
Their interventions provide financial markets with a working fiction of an ergodic 
world, and, rather than removing vulnerabilities, they counteract the very processes 
through which collective sense- making could solidify into effectively constraining 
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Note
 1 In technical terms, ‘[e] rgodicity is fulfilled, if the time average of a system or process 
equals its ensemble average. The time average is the average of one observed trajectory or 
realisation of a process (one time series). The ensemble average is the average over every 
possible state of a system’ (Kirstein 2015: 1). The assumption of ergodicity is crucial for 
predominant formalisations of economic dynamics as ‘the ergodic case is much easier 
to handle mathematically’, although in principle ‘non- ergodicity is a necessary property 
of a mathematical model, if the model is supposed to describe trajectory occurrences of 
endogenous novelties and change’ (ibid.).
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